











Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation





Allocating responsibility for accidents is one of the law's
primary functions. An important default principle of tort law in
the Anglo-American legal tradition is that harm must "lie
where it falls."' When harm results from conduct that the law
considers negligent, however, the law requires the negligent
party to bear the costs of the harm. Defining negligent conduct
and administering this definition properly is therefore critical
to determining who bears the cost of accidents.
Although the courts have adopted numerous
formulations of negligence, all revolve around the
reasonableness of a party's behavior. As noted in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "the standard of conduct to...
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances."2 Even though virtually all activities create a
risk of injury to others, tort law is not meant to convert
everyone into insurers whenever they undertake any action.'
So long as one's conduct conforms with the definition of
reasonableness, harm ordinarily will not result in liability. But
where the conduct is unreasonable, liability attaches.
In turn, the determination of reasonableness can only be
made with reference to the underlying purposes of tort law.
Scholars and courts disagree somewhat as to the primary
purpose of tort law, but there is substantial agreement on a
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number of basic principles.4 The two purposes scholars and
courts most commonly cite for tort law are to encourage efforts
to minimize the cost of accidents (the deterrence function)5 and
to make careless parties compensate their innocent victims (the
corrective justice function).6 In general, when people do not
account for the risk of harm to others that their activities pose,
courts consider their conduct unreasonable. Holding people
responsible for conduct that poses a substantial likelihood or
degree of harm, or for harm that is easy to avoid, furthers the
goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct by forcing people
to pay for the harm caused by actions with excessive social
costs.7 Liability also furthers corrective justice goals by forcing
those who engage in destructive behavior to compensate the
victims of their actions.8
In determining what constitutes reasonable conduct,
however, courts might inadvertently set unattainable
standards. On its face, the law demands nothing more than
that people perform as well as their physical abilities allow.
People are required only to apply such skill and care in
avoiding accidents as a hypothetical reasonable person would
under the circumstances.9 To determine whether an actor's
conduct was reasonable, a factfinder inevitably must examine
the circumstances surrounding an accident and judge whether
a reasonable person could have avoided the accident. If the
reasonable person, using her attention, memory and perceptual
abilities, would have avoided an accident, then the fact that an
accident occurred implies that the actor was engaged in
unreasonable conduct. Thus, determining whether a reasonable
person could have avoided an accident requires courts to endow
the hypothetical reasonable person with cognitive abilities.
Recent research on intuitive understanding of cognitive
abilities (known as "meta-cognition") suggests that the tort
law's seemingly sensible reasonable person test holds people to
an unobtainable standard. The law's hypothetical reasonable
person possesses those mnemonic and perceptual abilities
4 DAN B. DOBBS, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 12-13 (2001).
See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d
ed. 1989).
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
7 W.M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987).
8 G.P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility In Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
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consistent with the lay intuition of a judge or jury. If lay
intuition suggests people can see things that most people
actually fail to see, hear sounds that most people actually
cannot hear, attend to stimuli that most people actually miss
and remember events that most people actually forget, then the
reasonable person is actually a superhero; ordinary people
cannot conform their conduct to the entity endowed with these
abilities. Consequently, factfinders relying on the reasonable
person test will find people liable for accidents that they could
not have avoided with the exercise of reasonable care. By
comparing the conduct of ordinary people to that of an
idealized superhero, the law allocates fault where none exists
and labels reasonable conduct as unreasonable. Because recent
research suggests that people commonly overestimate cognitive
abilities, the application of the reasonable person test might
undermine the deterrence function and produce results wholly
inconsistent with ordinary notions of justice and fairness.
This Essay explores the question of whether the law's
reliance on an intuitively based standard creates a kind of
strict liability for accidents and the consequences of that
system's approach. Unlike some other cognitive impediments to
sound legal judgment,10 courts have never really considered the
possibility that they systematically overestimate people's
cognitive abilities. Consequently, it is difficult to place this
cognitive difficulty into a legal analysis. Nevertheless, this
Essay makes an attempt. Part I defines the reasonable person
test in more detail, evaluates the standard in light of the
purposes of tort theory and examines whether the research on
meta-cognition indicates that this standard is excessive. Part II
describes the consequences of an excessive reasonableness
standard. This Essay concludes in Part III by noting that even
though the standard appears too high, other factors suggest
that perhaps an excessive, idealized standard is not so
disastrous to the system as to warrant significant reform.
I. THE REASONABLE AND THE REAL PERSONS
It is well understood that tort law's reasonable person
represents an idealized standard to which no one conforms all
10 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998) (describing how the hindsight bias adversely
affects legal judgments and how the courts have adjusted to account for this problem).
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of the time.1 People commonly take risky shortcuts, and
attention often lapses in the face of monotonous tasks. Such is
the stuff of negligence. Even though the law defines the
reasonable person in idealized terms rather than in terms
consistent with actual behavior, the reasonable person test is
intended to describe an ideal to which all can, if they try,
conform. If the hypothetical reasonable person possesses
abilities that exceed those of most real people, however, then
courts hold people liable for innocent conduct.
A. Who is the Reasonable Person?
The definition of the reasonable person necessarily
incorporates the purposes underlying the tort system: deterring
socially undesirable conduct and compensating the victims of
such conduct. In an effort to further these purposes, however,
the tort system has created a standard to which no one
conforms all of the time. This is an acceptable aspect of the tort
system, however, because tort law is intended to signal
acceptable and unacceptable choices about how to behave.
Everyone sometimes behaves in a socially unacceptable
manner, and the obligation that the reasonable person test
creates is simply to pay for the consequences of such conduct.
The reasonable person test is meant simply to create an
administratively workable scheme for identifying inappropriate
choices that people make.
1. The Reasonable Person and the Purpose of Tort Law
The reasonable person is a fiction, a "creature of the
law's imagination." 2 Courts and legal scholars have attempted
to define the reasonable person precisely, but its meaning
remains elusive. Inevitably, definitions of the reasonable
person are intertwined with tort law's diverse and sometimes
conflicting purposes. Many scholars agree that the purposes of
the tort system are both to vindicate the rights of aggrieved
parties and to deter people from engaging in excessively risky
conduct. 3 This view is, however, not universal. Many law and
economics scholars contend that deterrence is the primary goal
" W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 174-75 (5th ed.
1984).
12 F.V. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 902 (1956).
," JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 31-33 (5th ed. 1999).
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of tort law. They worry that without the prospect of tort
liability, people will take little or no account of the harm that
their activities can impose on others.'4 For these scholars, tort
law is a way of encouraging people to take cost-effective
measures to reduce the number and cost of accidents. Other
scholars deny that the tort system is meant to deter
economically inefficient activity, arguing instead that it
primarily serves to vindicate the rights of those who have been
injured wrongfully. 5 These scholars argue that people have a
right to be free from carelessly caused injuries, and tort law is
a way of vindicating that right. This latter notion requires
some definition of the specific rights that tort law will
vindicate, but there is general agreement that community
standards of conduct determine which risks are unacceptable."
Despite some conflicts, the two basic purposes of tort
law coincide often enough that courts rarely find it necessary to
delineate tort law's purposes with greater precision.'7 To
illustrate, consider a stylized example. Suppose a driver is
running late for a business meeting and wants to speed to
arrive on time. Assume that if he is late for the meeting, there
is a one in ten chance that his client will be so angry at his
tardiness that he will lose $5,000 in lost sales. Also assume
that if he drives fast, he will make the meeting, but if he drives
at a normal speed, he will miss it. Further assume that at a
normal speed, he incurs a one in 100,000 chance of hitting (and
seriously injuring) a pedestrian, whereas if he drives fast that
risk increases to one in 1,000. Suppose that the accident will
impose $1,000,000 in costs on the pedestrian for lost wages,
hospitalization and some monetary quantification of pain and
suffering. Under these circumstances, the social costs of driving
fast are $990 ($1,000,000 (1/1,000 - 1/100,000)) and the social
benefits are $500 ($5,000 (1/10)). Without liability for
negligence, the driver faces incentives to drive fast, even
though the net social costs outweigh the benefits, because he
realizes only the benefits. A liability rule that imposes the full
social costs of driving too fast on the driver, however,
eliminates this incentive. Thus, under a deterrence-oriented
14 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 7, at 8.
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Weinrib, supra note 6.
COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 334.
17 Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice In Recent Theories of
Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981).
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analysis, driving fast to make the meeting imposes
unreasonable risks because the costs outweigh the benefits;
driving fast is economically inefficient. An assessment under a
corrective justice theory produces a similar result. Exposing
unwitting strangers to great risks of bodily injury for the sake
of a business relationship violates their rights to safety, and a
reasonable member of the community would not engage in such
conduct.
Both deterrence and corrective justice concerns place
the degree of risk imposed as a critical factor in the negligence
calculus."8 Under a deterrence theory, if driving fast only
slightly increases the risk of hitting a pedestrian, say to one in
10,000, then the social costs of driving fast are relatively small
(only $99). In such a case, the decision to drive fast is
reasonable, inasmuch as it averts a $500 loss at a cost of only
$99. If a business loss seems too trivial to compare to a physical
injury, one can change the hypothetical to suppose that the
driver is a doctor or ambulance driver speeding to the aid of an
injured person so as to make the type of injury consistent, but
so long as we are willing to quantify physical injuries, this
change is unimportant. Even though the decision to drive fast
imposes costs on the pedestrian, the law would consider such
costs a necessary part of ordinary life. Likewise, under a
corrective justice theory, people are entitled to drive, even
though doing so places others at risk. Pedestrians are entitled
only to freedom from careless driving that needlessly places
them at risk of injury. Walking the streets and driving
necessarily entail some risks, but so long as those risks are not
excessive, or not undertaken without regard to the pedestrian's
interests, the risks lie where they fall. Thus, risk is the critical
factor in the negligence calculus under both theories
underlying tort law, which often complement rather than
compete with each other.
In some instances, however, the principles underlying
tort law and the specific circumstances of the behavior produce
different outcomes. Scholars argue, for example, that in many
circumstances, even if the private benefits of an activity
outweigh the social costs, a reasonable person might refrain
from engaging in the activity.19 To illustrate, consider the
" Id. at 202-04.
'9 Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory,
48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
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difference between the rush to a business meeting and the rush
of a medic to an accident. A deterrence theorist might argue
that a reasonable person does not rush to a business meeting,
but does rush to a medical emergency, because the stakes in
the latter case are higher. Under this analysis, a reasonable
person would speed to a business meeting if the net benefits
were high enough to justify the social costs associated with
potential accidents that speeding would cause. In contrast, tort
theories based on corrective justice might condemn certain
activities, such as speeding, as inconsistent with social norms.
Hence, a court might deem unreasonable any speeding to a
business meeting, regardless of the stakes, while finding
acceptable and reasonable a medic's rush to an accident.
Even with this mix of potentially competing concerns,
courts have settled upon a generally accepted definition of the
reasonable person. This definition includes corrective justice
goals by referring to social norms: "The words 'reasonable man'
denote a person exercising those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires of
its members for the protection of their own interests and the
interests of others."2  The definition also incorporates
deterrence concerns by taking account of the value society
places on the risk the reasonable person creates and the
activity she undertakes.2'
2. Conformity with the Reasonable Person Standard
Whatever the definition, the idealized nature of the
reasonable person has long made it the subject of mockery. As
one scholar observed, "this excellent but odious character
stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice, vainly
appealing to his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own
example."22 According to this influential description, the
reasonable person:
invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the
immediate foreground before he executes a leap or bound;...
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1965).
21 Id. § 283 cmt. e (stating that conduct is reasonable if the "magnitude of the
risk outweighs the value which the law attaches to the conduct which involves it ...
[requiring the actor to] give an impartial consideration to the harm likely to be done
[in] the interests of the other as compared with the advantages likely to accrue to his
own interests, free from the natural tendency of the actor . . . to prefer his own
interests to those of others").
22 A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (1930).
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neither star-gazes nor is lost in meditation when approaching
trapdoors or the margin of a dock;...
never mounts a moving omnibus and does not alight from any car
while the train is in motion;...
will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before
administering a caress;...
never drives his ball until those in front of him have definitely
vacated the putting-green;...
never swears, gambles, or loses his temper; [and]...
23
uses nothing except in moderation.
Obviously, this tongue-in-cheek description is intended
to persuade the reader that everyone engages in conduct that
falls short of the requirements of the reasonable person.
Although each of the examples above arises from actual cases
in which a court held some conduct to be unreasonable, we
easily recognize ourselves in the failings of at least some of the
people in these cases. Only the hypothetical reasonable person
is free from negligence all of the time; the rest of us commit
negligent acts.
Identifying the characteristics of the reasonable person
also reveals the two common ways in which negligence occurs.
First, people choose to undertake excessive risk in their
activities. They take shortcuts, hurry along at an unreasonable
pace or simply choose to engage in conduct that entails more
risk than is socially sensible. Because the tort system forces
people to bear the cost of such decisions, it removes any
economic incentives for such conduct. Nevertheless, people
might irrationally hope that their choices will not result in
harm, or they might rationally recognize that in some
circumstances an injured party is unlikely to bring a successful
tort action against them. People often might not consider the
risks that their actions impose on others, but tort law holds
them responsible for failing to do so. Second, people's attention
often lapses in the face of monotonous, albeit dangerous tasks.
Despite tort law's requirement of reasonableness, it is difficult
to maintain focus on a repetitive task. Failing to pay as much
attention to a task as the reasonable person would may not be
a conscious choice, but it is still negligence and doubtless a
common source of accidents.
23 Id. at 10-11.
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The reasonable person, of course, never engages in
either folly. She never makes choices that impose an excess of
socially unacceptable risk, and she never lets her attention
lapse when undertaking risky activities. This is not to say the
reasonable person imposes no risks on others. She imposes
those risks that are socially acceptable and pays as much
attention as is needed to minimize the danger her activities
pose.
3. Why Rely on the Reasonable Person Standard?
Of course, no one conforms to the reasonable person
standard all the time. The attributes that courts ascribe to the
reasonable actor are true of no one. All of us have, at one time
or another, leapt before we looked. Consequently, some have
called for the elimination of the reasonable person test: "[I]f
[the reasonable person] is truly an inadequate, unrealistic, and
unmanageable creation and cannot readily be transformed into
something more satisfactory, perhaps we should admit failure
in our attempts to make fault a requisite to negligence
liability."
2 4
Why does the law rely on a standard to which not even
saints conform? The use of a legal fiction to identify
unreasonable conduct is a deliberate choice meant to solve the
difficult problem of identifying negligent conduct.25 Identifying
when conduct imposes a socially inappropriate degree of risk is
no easy task. Risk is an essential part of social life. At the same
time, it is wrong to impose an excess of risk on the innocent or
to impose it for no good reason. So long as the law attempts to
sort reasonable from unreasonable risks, the law requires some
means of distinguishing reasonable and unreasonable. Courts
developed the hypothetical reasonable person in an effort to
make the task tractable.
The administrative challenge of sorting reasonable from
unreasonable conduct is complicated by the necessity of
incorporating the underlying purposes of tort law into the
sorting process. Simply describing the purposes of the system
to the decision maker, without further elaboration, does not
provide enough guidance. Identifying the deterrent goal of the
system provides some indication as to what constitutes
24 Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Heath
Report on the "Odious Creature," 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410, 410-11 (1970).
25 KEETON, supra note 11, § 32.
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unreasonable conduct, but this is clearly inadequate on its own.
Rarely will the full numeric estimates needed to impose the
risk calculus be available." Similarly, identifying the
imposition of community norms as the standard is unhelpful
without identifying what those norms or standards are or, at
least, how to identify and ascertain them. The available cost-
benefit calculus and the sense of community standards will be
impressionistic at best.
The reasonable person test converts the esoteric and
intractable distinction between reasonable and unreasonable
risks into a comprehensible, intuitive inquiry. People
commonly judge the conduct of others in their ordinary lives.
Sorting people into those we would hire, befriend or date
requires judging the conduct of potential employees, friends or
lovers and assessing it as acceptable or unacceptable. In
making such determinations, we inevitably judge the conduct
of others against an idealized, hypothetical standard. An
employee who performs below expectations might get fired; we
might reduce contact with a friend who mistreats us; and a
disappointing first date might easily be the last date. In all
three examples, we judge the gap between what we expect out
of an employee, friend or romantic. interest and what we
observe. It is only natural that the law should borrow the same
judgmental skills for identifying unreasonable conduct. Rather
than conduct a meaningless, open-ended inquiry or a detailed
cost-benefit assessment requiring information that is unlikely
to be available, tort law asks only that the factfinder assess the
actor's conduct against an idealized norm, just as we tend to do
for our acquaintances.
The example involving the driver who is late for a
meeting illustrates this point. The law asks the factfinder to
ascertain whether a reasonable person, under the same
circumstances, would drive fast. A detailed cost-benefit
calculation is not available, but an intuitive one is. The risks
associated with speeding are well known (or can be identified
and articulated during the trial), even though they cannot be
quantified precisely. Likewise, most people understand the
benefits of getting to a meeting on time. The court can judge,
intuitively, whether driving fast is too risky by asking whether
a reasonable person who weighs the risks and benefits and
'6 See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.) (expressing
doubt about the wisdom of using a precise formula for the negligence standard).
1064 [Vol. 68: 4
MISUNDERSTANDING ABILITY
considers community standards would engage in the conduct. If
not, then the conduct is unreasonable, negligent and creates
the potential for liability.
The reasonable person test thus performs the basic task
of tort law-assignment of responsibility-in a way that relies
on familiar cognitive processes. Just as tort law attempts to
attribute harm either to unavoidable risks that are not entitled
to compensation or to blameworthy conduct by one or more
legal actors, so too do ordinary people attribute conduct either
to stable personality traits or to vagaries of a situation in which
people find themselves. Just as friends, employees and
romantic interests sometimes disappoint our expectations,
people inevitably fall short of the reasonable person standard
from time to time. Reliance on this idealized standard makes
the law's inquiry intuitive and tractable.
The use of the reasonable person test has other virtues
beyond the familiarity of its methodology. It is also intended to
avoid blaming the actor for accidents attributable to inalterable
physical limitations.27 Ascribing liability to someone for
physical deficiencies would be inconsistent with both the
deterrence and corrective justice theories underlying tort law.
The question for tort law is not whether a stronger, faster or
taller person would have avoided the accident, but whether a
person with the abilities of the actor facing the same situation
could have avoided the accident. The reasonable person test
easily incorporates these concerns by formulating its inquiry in
terms of whether a reasonable person with the actor's physical
characteristics could have avoided the harm.28
Finally, the reasonable person test largely maintains an
objective standard for liability.29 The test is not whether
someone felt that he did his best to avoid harm, given his own
personality, concerns and interests, but whether a reasonable
person would have been able to do so. As Justice Holmes noted:
[Wihen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice
of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary
to the general welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and
awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his
neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for the
27 KEETON, supra note 11, § 32.
28 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 118.
29 Id. §§ 117-18.
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courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his
neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect.
The standard of care is that of society at large and not that of
the individual. Thus, the standard easily can accommodate
changes in community norms or even changes in the goals of
tort law itself.3' Courts can also mold the reasonable person
test to support the underlying purpose of tort law. Under a
deterrence analysis, the reasonable person is expected to make
choices that maximize social utility. Under a corrective justice
analysis, the reasonable person conforms to a community
standard of conduct. Should society change its goals or the
value it places on certain activities, the reasonable person test
changes with it. In effect, the reasonable person is aware of
how the community views certain activities and certain risks
and incorporates these views into his or her own decision
making.
The reasonable person test is thus "a child of a certain
social necessity."" It is designed to provide a means of
identifying when it is inappropriate to take a shortcut or allow
oneself to get distracted. If a reasonable person would take the
shortcut or get distracted, then doing so does not give rise to
liability. If not, then doing so risks liability for any resulting
harm. The exact contours and nature of the risks a reasonable
person avoids are defined largely by a collective intuition about
appropriate behavior. This makes the standard tractable;
collective intuition properly focuses attention on choices that
could have been made and evolves as community norms about
behavior change.
Beyond these attributes, the persistence of the
reasonable person test in tort law also arises from the mildly
individualistic, almost libertarian flavor of the common law. In
the American legal tradition, people are free to let their
attentions wander or lapse, just as they are free to trespass or
break contracts, so long as they pay for the consequences of
their actions. Tort law sets a standard intended to guide
people's conduct, to identify right and wrong. But the obligation
tort law creates is merely to pay for the consequences of these
lapses, not necessarily to avoid them at all costs. After all, this
30 HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108.
31 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 118.
3' Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of
the "Reasonable Man," 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 311, 314 (1977).
1066 [Vol. 68: 4
MISUNDERSTANDING ABILITY
is torts, not criminal law. People can avoid liability by paying
more attention, avoiding shortcuts, making appropriate inquiry
into their surroundings and generally behaving like the
reasonable person.
In creating the hypothetical person, the law borrows
heavily from the intuitive attribution process familiar to social
psychologists. Social psychologists have argued that one of the
fundamental cognitive tasks people face in social life is
determining whether a person's conduct results from her
personality or from the situation in which she finds herself.33
Although errors can creep into this process, people generally
rely on a set of rational heuristics to make such attributions.
People attend to whether they observe the same behaviors in
different situations and whether other people behave the same
way in the same situation.34 These observations allow people to
assess whether a behavior is the product of a stable, internal
characteristic of the actor or whether it is a transient behavior
that is attributable to the features of a situation. The
reasonable person test is meant to incorporate these well
developed abilities into the assessment of negligence. If the
conduct of even an idealized reasonable person would replicate
the adverse outcome that the actor in question produced, then
blame for the adverse outcome does not lie with the actor. In
such a case, blame more sensibly is ascribed to other actors or
to the unavoidable risks of living in a complex industrial
society.
The goal of the reasonable person test is to harness the
familiar process of social attribution to the task of identifying
when a person should have behaved differently so as to avoid
harm to others. The system is designed to avoid making people
pay for harms that result from unavoidably risky situations
and to avoid making people pay for their physical limitations.
Unavoidable injuries cannot be deterred and are also unlikely
to justify compensation. Thus, the focus of the reasonable
person test is on choice and lapses, not on the circumstances or
the physical or cognitive deficiencies of the actor.
3' RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 30-32 (1980).
34 See generally Harold H. Kelley, Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, in
15 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION at 192 (David Levine ed., 1967).
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B. The Role of Human Abilities in Assessing
Reasonableness
The assessment of the reasonable person could end at
this point in a neat rule: People are free to make choices about
the risk their activities pose to others so long as they pay for
any consequences. The reasonable person test is meant to allow
the factfinder to distinguish between accidents attributable to
lapses in attention or to bad decisions, and those accidents
attributable to unfortunate, but unavoidable, situations or to a
lack of physical ability. Nevertheless, if judges and juries
endow the reasonable person with abilities greater than most
people possess, then close attention and good judgment might
be insufficient to avoid liability. If judges and juries overstate
people's physical or cognitive abilities, then accidents that are
unavoidable in spite of reasonable conduct will be attributed to
negligence.
To see this, consider again the hypothetical in which a
driver faces a choice to drive moderately (and potentially miss
a meeting and suffer monetary loss) or quickly (and risk hitting
a pedestrian). Suppose this driver hits a pedestrian and the
pedestrian sues the driver. If negligent haste caused the
accident, then the driver is liable; if the accident was the result
of ordinary misfortune, then the driver is not liable. To defend
himself, the driver must claim that he was proceeding at a
reasonable speed. In some cases, the legal factfinder (judge or
jury) may have an objective indication of this choice. The
length of any skidmarks could indicate the driver's speed, or
an eyewitness might provide information on the
reasonableness of the driver's conduct. Commonly, however,
direct indications are unavailable. Instead, the factfinder must
make an inference about the driver's conduct from the
circumstances. The question in many cases thus becomes
whether a driver proceeding at a reasonable speed would have
been able to avoid hitting the pedestrian. If so, then the only
logical inference is that the driver was not proceeding at a
reasonable speed.
This analysis reveals the important role that intuitions
about cognitive abilities play in law. The inquiry requires that
the factfinder mentally simulate the circumstances
surrounding the accident with the hypothetical reasonable
person at the wheel. The factfinder must assess the accident as
if the driver were traveling at a reasonable speed and then
determine whether this fictitious driver would have avoided
1068 [Vol. 68: 4
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the accident. This hypothetical driver must have some
cognitive abilities in order for the factfinder to ascertain
whether the situation would result in an accident.
To make the example more specific, suppose that the
driver strikes a pedestrian who darted out into an intersection.
Further, suppose the pedestrian claims that a driver traveling
at a reasonably safe speed should have been able to stop or
swerve in time to avoid hitting her. The driver denies this
claim and asserts that he was traveling at a reasonably safe
speed. Unless the trial produces direct evidence of the driver's
speed, the factfinder will have to infer his speed from the facts
surrounding situation. In such a situation, the reaction time
imputed to a hypothetical reasonable driver could determine
the outcome of the case.
Suppose that 25 miles per hour ("mph") is the speed
limit and would be considered a reasonable speed. Further
suppose that expert testimony reveals that after the brakes
were applied the driver's car would travel 37.5 feet if the driver
was traveling at 25 mph.35 The factfinder must also impute to
the driver a perception time (time needed to see the pedestrian
and identify her as a hazard requiring full braking) and a
reaction time (time needed to get the foot to brake). If the
factfinder assesses both at 0.5 seconds, the factfinder will
believe the total braking distance for the car to be 74.5 feet if
the driver was traveling at 25 mph (37 feet per second plus
37.5 feet of braking). If the factfinder can then determine that
the pedestrian entered the intersection when the driver was
greater than 74.5 feet away, then the factfinder can conclude
that the driver was driving too fast. The comparison of the
outcome to that which a reasonable actor would have obtained
facilitates the assessment of the actor's conduct as reasonable
or unreasonable.
But what if the factfinder overestimates the reasonable
person's reaction time? Suppose the reaction time of most
people under these circumstances is actually 0.75 seconds to
perceive and process the pedestrian and 0.75 seconds to react.
The total stopping distance for the true reasonable actor would
therefore be 93 feet at 25 mph (55.5 feet for the reaction time
These numbers are just fabricated, but it might be important to consider
that the stopping distance upon braking will increase exponentially rather than
linearly with the speed of the car. The same is not true of the distance the car will
travel between the time when the driver sees the obstacle and when the driver applies
the brake, which will increase as a linear function of speed.
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plus 37.5 feet for the stopping distance). Thus, if the driver was
actually driving at the reasonably safe speed of 25 mph and the
factfinder believes that the driver was roughly 80 feet from the
pedestrian when the pedestrian entered the intersection, then
the factfinder using the 0.5 second reaction time will
mistakenly deem the driver negligent.
The problem gets worse as conditions that might impair
cognitive ability become part of the circumstances. Even if the
factfinder has an accurate appreciation of the abilities of the
average person under good conditions, the factfinder might fail
to appreciate the effects of darkness, unexpected situations or
distractions. In effect, a court cannot cure misperception simply
by adopting a uniform standard for human reaction times-
reaction times depend too much on external circumstances. So
long as a factfinder overestimates people's abilities or
underestimates the effect of adverse conditions on abilities, he
will infer that people are negligent when their behavior, in fact,
was reasonable.
A similar analysis applies to lapses of attention. For
example, suppose a woman is walking along a sidewalk that is
under repair. Suppose at the same time she approaches a break
in the sidewalk that sensibly should be circumvented, she
hears screeching brakes and a car sounding its horn in a
nearby intersection. Although distracted, she continues
walking and catches her heel on the broken sidewalk. She falls
and is seriously injured. Is she negligent?36 The answer turns
on whether a reasonable person would have been so distracted
under the circumstances that she would have failed to notice a
gap in the sidewalk. If not, then the factfinder must attribute
the accident to a negligent lapse in attention. The court must
conclude that a reasonable person would not have allowed the
distraction to affect her behavior.
Thus, although the legal system's goal is to encourage
people to make reasonable decisions, the assessment of their
conduct commonly turns on an assessment of human abilities.
Because of the importance of human abilities, the courts have
tried to define the cognitive abilities of the reasonable person."
Indeed, defining the reasonable person's abilities plays an
important role in the Restatement (Second) of Torts's definition
36 Note that if she is, she may be unable to recover compensation for her
injury from the municipality for failing to repair the sidewalk; but if she is not, then it
is possible that she could recover.
37 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 120.
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of negligence, which requires that people use "such attention,
perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of
pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable
man would have."38 Hence, the focus on reasonable behavior
quickly turns to an assessment of whether the actor, if she had
behaved reasonably, would have avoided causing harm.
At this point, the law provides little further guidance.
Courts rely heavily on intuition to define human ability. Courts
assume only that people remember things a reasonable person
would remember, attend to things a reasonable person would
attend to and see things a reasonable person would see. The
law assumes that judges and juries have accurate knowledge
about human mnemonic and perceptual ability. This
assumption, however, may be deeply flawed.
C. The Abilities of the Real Person
Recent cognitive psychological research indicates that
people's beliefs about cognitive processes are indeed inaccurate.
Although people underestimate some cognitive abilities, such
as the ability to recognize pictures,39 overestimation of cognitive
abilities presents a greater problem for the legal system.
Cognitive psychologists have documented two important
circumstances in which people overestimate cognitive abilities:
inattention blindness and change blindness blindness.4 ° Both
are critical to the kinds of tasks that jurors and judges must
perform and can contribute to misidentification of reasonable
behavior as negligent.
First, people show a marked inattention blindness.4"
That is, people overestimate their ability to detect peripheral
stimuli when concentrating on a particular task. In one
compelling demonstration, subjects were asked to concentrate
on the complex cognitive task of tracking the movements of
three basketballs among six people. Fifty percent of the
subjects failed to notice the appearance of a person dressed in a
gorilla suit among the basketball players, even though all of
the subjects predicted that they would notice the appearance-of
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
'9 Daniel T. Levin & Melissa R. Beck, Thinking About Seeing: Spanning the
Difference Between Metacognitive Failure and Success, in VISUAL METACOGNITION:
THINKING ABOUT SEEING (Daniel Levin, ed., forthcoming 2003).
40 Id.
4' ARIEN MACK & IRVIN ROCK, INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS (1998).
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such an unusual stimulus. 42 This finding, along with the results
of several similar studies, suggest that people underestimate
the dramatic effects that concentrating on a particular task can
have on one's ability to attend to peripheral events. 3
Second, people also fail to appreciate the difficulty of
detecting changes in the perceptual environment: so-called
change blindness blindness . For example, in one study,
subjects failed to notice changes in the environment that
occurred between cuts of a video portraying a conversation
between two women, even though the subjects predicted that
people would notice such changes. In the study, although 76%
of the subjects predicted that they would notice a change in the
color of dinner plates in the video, no subject actually watching
the video noticed such a change. Other studies reveal that
when two scenes that differ only slightly are presented in
succession to subjects, those looking for the change take much
longer to identify the change than subjects who are aware of
the change predicted that they would take.46 People's intuition
about vision and attention tells them that they would notice
changes right before their eyes, but studies show that people
discount how cognitively difficult it is to recognize many
changes.
Both inattention blindness and change blindness
blindness have the potential to mislead courts as to the
reasonableness of an actor's conduct. Drivers who fail to notice
a stop sign, bicyclist or construction worker might not be acting
unreasonably. A factfinder might infer that the failure to detect
hazards was the result of excess speed or failure to pay
adequate attention to the task, even if the appropriate
inference is that the hazard presented a particularly difficult
detection profile. Similarly, underestimating the length of time
that detecting a change in the visual environment takes in an
ordinary person can distort the inferences people make about
the circumstances surrounding an accident. As noted above, a
factfinder who underestimates the length of time perception
42 Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorilla in Our Midst:
Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059 (1999).
43 See generally LEVIN & BECK, supra note 39.
" Daniel T. Levin et al., Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive
Error of Over-Estimating Change-detection Ability, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 397 (2000).
45 id.
46 Ronald A. Resnick et al., To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to
Perceive Changes in Scenes, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 368 (1997).
1072 [Vol. 68: 4
MISUNDERSTANDING ABILITY
takes will infer that a driver was traveling faster than was
actually the case. These two phenomena suggest that reliance
on intuition about cognitive processes leads courts astray.
The studies of inattention blindness and change
blindness blindness arguably fail to reflect natural conditions.
People in gorilla suits do not commonly pop unexpectedly into
basketball games, nor are they often the cause of accidents.
Likewise, the kinds of changes in the change blindness studies
often involve unlikely or even impossible changes in the
environment. Plates do not magically change color outside the
psychologist's laboratory. By using exotic or outlandish
changes, researchers may be exaggerating the existence of
change blindness in two ways.47 First, an impossible change in
the environment is necessarily an unexpected change. If
people's expectations influence the ease with which they can
detect changes, then impossible changes should be among the
hardest to detect because they fail to track people's lifetime of
experience with the real world. Second, impossible changes
seem so outrageous and exotic that once identified, it becomes
harder to see how they were missed than more ordinary or
mundane changes. To be sure, some of the studies involve
changes in meaningless symbols in which no expectations can
be said to be present,48 and others involve impossible, but fairly
mundane, changes.49 Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effects
seen in the studies so far might greatly exceed the effects
present in the real world. The underlying processes that
produce inattention blindness and change blindness blindness
might not be a generic overstatement of cognitive abilities, but
rather a failure to appreciate how sensitive the perceptual
system is to distractions and expectations. If so, then the
research thus far might be exaggerating the effect.
The subject matter of lawsuits, however, does not
consist of a random sample of the experiences people encounter
in the real world. Tort suits only arise from those accidents
that might be attributable to the carelessness of someone other
than the injured party. If many accidents occur precisely
because of unusual or unexpected circumstances, then the
47 Rachel A. Diana & Lynne M. Reder, Visual vs. Verbal Metacognition: Are
They Really Different?, in VISUAL METACOGNITION: THINKING ABOUT SEEING (Daniel
Levin, ed., forthcoming 2003); Daniel T. Levin, Change Blindness Blindness as Visual
Metacognition, J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD., May-June, 2002, at 111.
41 See generally MACK & ROCK, supra note 41.
49 See generally Levin et al., supra note 44.
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psychological experiments might have more external validity
for tort lawsuits than it would otherwise seem. People's sense
of their own cognitive abilities usually keeps them safe. Drivers
understand that a complex visual horizon filled with cars,
bicycles, pedestrians, construction workers and intricate traffic
signs requires them to slow down to process potential hazards
properly. If people fail to appreciate the importance of certain
kinds of less familiar distractions, however, then they will fail
to take precautions against instances of change blindness and
inattention that lead to accidents. Likewise, the same failure to
appreciate change blindness and inattention that caused the
accident will influence the factfinder. Thus, courts will
necessarily review behavior in those settings in which
inattention blindness and change blindness blindness have the
biggest effects. Even if the psychological studies seem a bit
artificial, they might mimic the circumstances in which the
effects are the most important both to identifying the causes of
accidents and to assigning responsibility for accidents.
One final link is also missing to connect the erroneous
intuitions about cognitive abilities to the process of assigning
blame in the courtroom: No direct empirical evidence exists on
the issue. Although psychologists have conducted numerous
experiments to identify misperceptions about cognitive
abilities, no one has yet clearly demonstrated that these
misperceptions lead to mistaken assignments of blame. It may
be that the legal context adds safeguards that prevent the
kinds of mistaken attributions that might arise from
misperception of cognitive ability. A reluctance to assign blame
to individuals who otherwise seem to have tried their best to
avoid accidents might make factfinders skeptical enough to
overcome their misunderstanding of cognitive abilities.
Nevertheless, in the context of eyewitness identification,
psychologists have convincingly demonstrated that mistaken
beliefs about cognition can and do lead to wrongful criminal
convictions." Assignment of blame in a tort suit is much less
serious than in a criminal case; hence, the influences cognitive
abilities misperceptions on blame might be even more
pronounced in this setting. All available evidence and some
intuition indicate that overestimation of cognitive abilities has
Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002).
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enormous potential for affecting judgments in tort suits, even
without the final link in the empirical chain.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
REASONABLE AND REAL PERSONS
A mismatch between people's actual abilities and those
of the law's reasonable person seems, at least superficially, to
be a legal disaster. The magnitude of this effect is
circumstance-specific, but overstating people's ability to avoid
accidents generally leads judges and juries to brand as
negligent conduct that was reasonable. Reliance on this
misunderstanding of cognitive abilities might be unjust and
create inefficient incentives. It is easy to overstate the adverse
effects of this problem, however. A closer analysis suggests that
courts do not completely trust the somewhat ad hoc reasonable
person test. Several legal doctrines have evolved that reduce
the influence of the reasonable person test and thereby
ameliorate, to some extent, the impact of the mismatch. These
doctrines, however, are not the product of judicial recognition
of the intuitive misunderstanding of cognitive ability. Rather,
they have resulted from efforts to address other concerns or
from a sense that the reasonable person test is too vague to be
reliable. Consequently, these doctrines are likely to provide
only inadequate mechanisms to address the consequences of
overstating people's cognitive abilities.
A. Strict Liability in the Guise of Negligence
If judges and juries persistently overstate the cognitive
abilities of legal actors, then the system of negligence, in
practice, might more closely resemble a system of strict
liability. When a legal factfinder mistakenly assumes that a
reasonable person could have avoided an accident, the
factfinder might mistakenly attribute the accident to some
unreasonable conduct, rather than to misfortune. Thus, people
who are acting reasonably will seem unreasonable when judged
under a standard that misstates human abilities. In practice,
the system finds people liable even though their behavior
conformed to that of the reasonable person. In effect, the
system consists of liability without fault, that is, a system of
strict liability. The conversion of de jure negligence into de
facto strict liability has some adverse effects on the incentives




Although it intuitively seems that the unwitting
conversion of a negligence system into a strict liability system
would profoundly influence the incentive structure tort law
creates, the effects are apt to be much more subtle. It is well
understood in the legal literature that strict liability does not
create undesirable incentives with respect to the level of care
actors might take.5' That is, whether legal actors face a
negligence regime or a strict liability regime, they face
incentives to take reasonable precautions against causing
harm. Under a negligence regime, someone who takes all
reasonable precautions against causing injury saves money by
avoiding liability. Any extra safety measures beyond
reasonable care simply impose costs on the actor without
conferring any benefits to him. Under a strict liability regime,
an actor is responsible for all harm his activities cause,
whether he takes reasonable precautions or not. Under such a
regime, a person minimizes his total costs by taking all
reasonable precautions and taking no further precautions.
Safety precautions above and beyond reasonableness would
reduce the number (or cost) of accidents for which someone is
strictly liable, but the costs to the actor would exceed the
savings. So long as courts define reasonableness as minimizing
total social costs, then both negligence and strict liability create
the same incentives as to the degree of care to take when
engaging in an activity. Both schemes encourage people to
behave as would the reasonable person."
Strict liability, however, has several advantages. Strict
liability is a cheaper system to administer because it does not
create complicated and expensive litigation over what
constitutes reasonable behavior under the circumstances. 3
Although litigation over whether the actor has actually caused
the harm may still occur, a negligence system incurs the same
litigation expenses for proving causation. Strict liability simply
removes the fault issue from the litigation process. Inasmuch
as this issue is frequently contentious and costly to resolve,
strict liability will make the system more cost effective.
Furthermore, relieving the court of the burden of determining
" See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1980).
Id.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 65.
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whether conduct was negligent might improve decision
making. The actor might well know more about the costs and
benefits of the available precautions than a court would and
might thereby make a better choice. Strict liability gives actors
the incentive to make the best choice with no need for a court
to judge their conduct afterwards. As a related issue, because of
the uncertainty associated with the reasonableness test, a
negligence rule creates incentives to take an excess of care.54
This occurs because potential tort defendants may recognize
that if they are slightly more careful, they might avoid liability,
thereby significantly reducing their likely costs.
Strict liability has its problems, however, particularly
when it is unintended. Most notably, it raises the cost of the
underlying activity." As the driving example shows, it is more
expensive to drive under a strict liability system than under a
negligence system. By "taxing" an activity, strict liability might
inefficiently shift people's behavior from one activity to
another. More people might walk if driving were governed by
strict liability.56  Therein lies the economic danger of
administering a negligence system in a way that converts it
into a system of strict liability. Limiting liability to negligent
conduct is meant to keep down the cost of activities. We want
people to be free to drive or walk without facing the costs
associated with strict liability. Only in rare instances is strict
liability thought to be more sensible.57
Furthermore, strict liability that results from a bias in
the negligence determination has other undesirable effects.
Inasmuch as the scheme is not straightforward strict liability,
it still requires that a court assess reasonableness. Thus, a
biased negligence system produces results similar to strict
liability, but without saving litigation costs. More troublesome,
however, is that a negligence system biased in favor of liability
also is likely to produce incentives to take an excess of care
beyond that required by reasonableness alone.58 Because the
54 John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Rachlinski, supra note
10, at 596-600.
55 See POLINSKY, supra note 5.
56 Id.
57 For example, manufacturers are strictly liable for manufacturing defects in
products liability cases. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension
in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 931-39 (1981) (discussing the virtues of
strict liability for manufacturing defects in products liability cases).
58 Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 611.
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system is not true strict liability, the possibility exists that an
actor can undertake an excess of care so that when accidents
happen, even under a biased inquiry, the court will not find the
actor's conduct unreasonable. The savings that the actor
realizes from avoiding liability encourages the actor to take
excessive precautions. This incentive does not occur with true
strict liability because no degree of precaution will protect the
actor from liability in the event that harm results.
Consider how this might work, using the running
example involving an accident between a driver and a
pedestrian. 9 In the example, the factfinder would find the
driver liable because of a mistaken belief that the reaction time
of the reasonable person is one second, even though a
reasonable person would take 1.5 seconds. If the driver
understood that he would be judged as if his reaction time were
quicker than is actually the case, the driver could simply drive
slower so as to avoid any accident for which he could be held
negligent. Suppose that the driver drives at 20 mph. If so, then
the braking distance is 45 feet during the 1.5 second reaction
time, plus 24 feet traveled after the driver applies the brake for
a total of 69 feet. This means that for an accident to occur the
pedestrian would have to have appeared in front of the driver
at 69 feet or less (otherwise the driver would have stopped in
time). With its bias about a one-second reaction time, the jury
would assume that a reasonable person traveling at 25 mph or
less would have been able to stop within 74.5 feet. Thus, any
accident that could occur would necessarily lead a factfinder to
determine that the driver was traveling at less than 25 mph.
By overcomplying with the requirements of reasonable person
test, the driver would avoid liability. This excess compliance
would cost the driver in terms of lost time, but avoiding the
risk of liability would likely offset that loss. The excess of
caution might be worth the price to the driver, even though it is
inefficient overall.
Although it might seem perfectly sensible for the system
to produce incentives to undertake a slight excess of safety,
excess safety has hidden costs.6° Often, safety precautions can
be so cumbersome that they make the underlying activity
worthless. Consider, for example, police safety vests; they can
be made with open sides or completely wrap around the user.
59 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
60 Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996).
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The latter type are safer, but they make it so difficult for the
user to move that they create other risks. Similarly, if drivers
drive too slowly, they might reduce the overall speed of traffic,
thereby costing other drivers time or creating traffic jams that
cause pollution. Thus, excess safety might undermine its
perceived benefits.
2. Corrective Justice
Whatever the economics, strict liability seems unjust.
Branding someone's conduct as negligent when it was
reasonable smacks of inherent unfairness. As a matter of
justice, if the courts deliberately have adopted a system of
liability for negligence, then finding people negligent when
they actually took due care is wrong. The wrongful finding of
negligence mislabels an innocent party as a wrongdoer and
compensates a party that is not entitled to compensation.
Furthermore, where the actor only seems negligent
because of a biased negligence calculus, the injured party does
not deserve compensation for the harm because the actor was
not, in fact, negligent. The victim of the accident did nothing to
deserve the injury, but if the actor who caused the injury
behaved reasonably, then the actor is not at fault. After all, the
actor obeyed society's command to behave reasonably. The
law's basic maxim to let the harm lie where it falls trumps any
desire to compensate the injured victim. Shifting the cost onto
the actor when the actor was indeed reasonable is costly and
unfairly brands the actor a wrongdoer. Unless the actor
actually failed to conform to social norms, the cost and the label
are not justifiable. Biased negligence processes thereby
undermine the very morality of the tort system.
On the other hand, whatever the label, this misbranding
is perhaps not such a serious injustice. Most drivers, for
example, recognize that the act of driving exposes them to
liability. They know that even if they are careful, they might
find themselves the target of a lawsuit, which they might even
lose. Most people insure against serious loss and live with the
consequences of a system that might occasionally mislabel
one's conduct. Furthermore, after an accident occurs, the
defendant can review his own conduct only in light of the meta-
cognitive biases that psychologists have identified. If the driver
is uncertain about what speed he was traveling, he might make
the same inferences about reaction time, reasonableness and
speed that the legal factfinder might make. Oddly enough, even
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if the process is unjust, the actor himself, suffering from the
same cognitive biases as the factfinder, might fail to notice the
injustice.6
Furthermore, there is a global sense that some of the
biases in cognitive meta-cognition are intuitive. A lifetime of
experience teaches people that when they focus their attention
on one task, they often fail to notice peripheral events.62 The
ability to avoid processing distractions is the essence of
concentration, and people learn that when their attention is so
focused, they likely will fail to process stimuli outside of their
attentional focus. In the driving example, the fact that the
driver was traveling too fast is not what makes him a negligent
danger to pedestrians. Rather, it is the attentional focus that
being late creates. The pressure of having to drive quickly can
lead the driver to miss important aspects of the environment
and thus fail to respond to them within an appropriate time.
The mistake lies in failing to arrange one's time properly so as
to avoid driving while in a hurry. Arguably, inasmuch as
everyone seems to suffer from meta-cognitive biases, this
mistake is not negligent-it is a byproduct of how reasonable
people think about their cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, it is a
mistake. In the end, people might get roughly what they
deserve; people put others at risk because they overestimate
their abilities, yet they are found liable because a factfinder
also overestimates their abilities.
3. The Effect of Conflicting Cognitive Biases
The influence of these meta-cognitive biases also likely
has an effect beyond the courtroom. If people overstate
cognitive abilities, then they also might overestimate their own
ability to perform various skilled tasks, such as driving, safely.
For example, if drivers overestimate their ability to perceive
and react to hazards, they might drive faster than they would if
their understanding of their cognitive abilities was accurate. In
fact, overestimating cognitive abilities might underlie the
common finding that people are overconfident about their
abilities. For example, in one study, 86% of automobile drivers
stated that they drive more safely than the average driver.63 If
61 Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 600-02.
62 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
0 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow
Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981).
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people constantly see other drivers failing to react as quickly as
they predict they would be able to react, people experience a
world filled with unreasonable drivers who are less safe than
they are.
Legal scholars have noted that such overconfidence in
ability might lead people to engage in conduct that seems safe
to them but that is, in fact, negligent or even reckless." People
who believe that they can easily avoid an accident might not
worry much about their risk of causing an accident or the legal
liability they might face if they do cause an accident.
Overconfidence can thus undermine the ability of the legal
system to induce people to undertake reasonable care. People
who engage in unreasonable conduct while believing their
conduct to be reasonable cannot easily be deterred by the
prospects of tort liability.
In the only thorough assessment of the effects of excess
optimism on efforts to avoid accidents, however, Eric Posner
has argued that, although an excess of optimism can induce
people to undertake excessively risky activities, it also can
induce people to take an excess of precautions under some
circumstances.65 Posner contends that optimism can produce an
excess of care if people overestimate the benefits of precautions
that they consider taking. For example, if drivers believe that
undertaking a single precaution (perhaps driving 5 mph under
the speed limit) would reduce the possibility of an accident to
zero, then they will undertake that precaution, even if doing so
is not cost-effective. It is unclear whether an excess of optimism
arising from misperception of cognitive abilities would operate
the way Posner describes. Overestimating one's cognitive
abilities seems intuitively like a prescription for inducing
dangerous conduct. In particular, overestimation of one's
abilities might keep drivers from slowing down when they face
a complicated or distracting array of stimuli. If such
overestimation also produces a tendency to overestimate one's
ability to avoid an accident with just a little excess of care,
however, it might produce an excess of care.
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051 (2000).
65 Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative
Implications for Tort and Contract Law (Univ. Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law




If overestimation of cognitive abilities produces
excessively risky conduct, then it has a doubly pernicious effect
on the legal system. It may be that we have a system in which
people unwittingly drive negligently (i.e., they drive in a
manner they mistakenly feel is safe), while at the same time
they are held to a standard that they cannot meet (i.e., legal
factfinders assume the reasonable person can drive more safely
than people really drive). Even though the legal system is
actually creating incentives for drivers to drive too slowly,
drivers, overconfident in their abilities, disregard or fail to
recognize these incentives and go on driving in a dangerous
fashion.
Overestimation of cognitive abilities by both potential
tortfeasors and legal factfinders thus combine to produce an
odd system. Potential tortfeasors overestimate their abilities
and thereby fail to undertake reasonable precautions against
causing harm. At the same time, the system, overestimating
peoples' abilities, holds potential tortfeasors accountable for
failing to use the abilities the system mistakenly ascribes to
them. In effect, people behave as if they possess heroic
cognitive abilities and are held accountable as if they had such
abilities. Although it is possible that tortfeasors recognize that
they will be held to a high standard if they are found liable and
adjust their behavior accordingly, it does not seem likely that
this doubly biased system is altogether a sensible arrangement.
B. Legal Doctrines that Blunt the Effect of Misjudgment
Several developments in the common law over the past
century have blunted the effect of mistaken beliefs about
cognitive abilities on judgments of liability. Indeed, if the
effects of these mistaken beliefs are widespread, it would be
surprising if centuries of common-law development had not, in
some way, accounted for these misperceptions. Judges, as
intuitive psychologists, are unlikely to have uncovered the
same phenomenon that required careful research to document,
but judges might have observed difficulties with the reasonable
person test as it evolved. Biased application of the reasonable
person test might have produced undesirable or unreliable sets
of verdicts that astute courts or legislatures might, over time,
have noticed and attempted to correct. Identification of such
problems might be one reason that courts developed alternative
means of identifying negligence.
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1. Bright Line Rules
In fact, courts avoid the ad hoc implementation of the
reasonable person test whenever possible. To combat the
undesirable effects of the reasonable person test, several bright
line rules of conduct have emerged as a means of making
negligence judgments more reliable. Most notably, for accident
law, the violation of a safety rule or regulation provides per se
evidence of negligence.66 For example, driving at a speed in
excess of the speed limit is, without excuse or justification (as
might be the case for a life-threatening emergency), sufficient
evidence to support a determination that the driver was
negligent. In effect, drivers are not entitled to rely on their own
judgment about what would constitute a safe speed, nor may a
judge or jury substitute their judgment. The law provides a
safe maximum speed, and exceeding it is negligence, even if
one believes a reasonable person would do so.
To be sure, bright line rules are incomplete. Bright line
rules tend to be asymmetric. Although exceeding the speed
limit provides conclusive evidence that the driver was traveling
at a negligent speed, driving within the posted speed limit does
not provide per se evidence that the driver was driving at a
reasonable speed.67 This leaves plenty of room for judges and
juries to determine the safety of a driver who does not cross a
bright line but who nevertheless might be negligent.
2. Comparative Negligence
Perhaps the most dramatic shift in negligence law in
the last half-century has been the nearly universal adoption of
shared liability systems.6" The common law developed under a
fairly absolute system in which the courts attributed liability
completely to the plaintiff or the defendant. Defendants found
to be negligent could expect to pay for the full extent of harm
their negligence caused unless they could show that the
plaintiff was also negligent, in which case they would pay
nothing. This system, known as contributory negligence,
however, survives only in a handful of American jurisdictions.69
DOBBS, supra note 4, at 315-16.
67 KEETON, supra note 11, at 233.
DOBBS, supra note 4, at 503-04.
69 Id. at 504.
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Comparative negligence regimes, in which the two negligent
parties share liability, are now the dominant norm.
Comparative negligence can blunt the effects of meta-
cognitive biases on the assessment of negligence. The same
biases that would lead a factfinder to overestimate the
defendant's abilities would also lead the factfinder to over-
estimate the plaintiffs abilities. For example, the jury that
believes that a defendant who was driving reasonably would
have seen a pedestrian in time to avoid him might just as likely
think that a reasonable pedestrian would have seen the driver
in time to leap out of the way. Even if neither the driver nor
the pedestrian are at fault, both will be held responsible. To be
sure, if the defendant was not really at fault, the defendant
should have to pay nothing. The comparative negligence
scheme, however, reduces what the defendant would have to
(wrongfully) pay under a biases assessment of liability.
Likewise, even though the plaintiff might be blameless (and
hence should be entitled to a full recovery), the jury might find
him negligent. His recovery will be reduced because of meta-
cognitive biases, but not eliminated, as it would be under a
contributory scheme. A comparative scheme might lead to a
balancing of biases.
Misperceptions of cognitive abilities help explain the
attraction of a comparative negligence system. Although the
attraction of comparative negligence might seem obvious-in
that it apportions liability between the parties in a way that is
commensurate with their relative fault-the comparative fault
system also entails a significant downside. Economic analysis
suggests that comparative fault does nothing to make
incentives more efficient, but it does make the system more
expensive because it is a complicated determination that
entails significant litigation costs.7" Thus, an economic
efficiency analysis finds little or no use for comparative
negligence. Aside from economics, the scheme also seems to
blunt many of the useful, sharp distinctions the law makes
between degrees and types of misconduct. Some misconduct is
so pernicious that the liability it creates should not be reduced
by the good fortune of directing it at someone who may have
been only slightly negligent. The overall advantage of a
comparative system becomes more apparent once the courts
recognize that the negligence analysis they have created
70 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 82.
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contains significant potential for inaccuracy. If the reasonable
person test is truly unreliable, then it makes little sense to rely
on it as if it were a perfect indicator of reasonable and
unreasonable conduct. In effect, the comparative scheme is a
less confident approach to liability that softens the unnaturally
sharp divisions the law otherwise might make. The courts' lack
of confidence in the reasonable person test can be justified in
many different ways, but clearly if factfinders lack an accurate
understanding of human cognitive abilities, their assessments
of reasonableness commonly will be inaccurate.
3. The Adverse Consequences of Comparative
Negligence
Even though the switch to comparative negligence
blunted the rough edges that contributory negligence creates,
thereby reducing the adverse impact of mistaken beliefs about
law, it also might have undermined the development of some
bright line rules that could have further reduced the effect of
meta-cognitive biases on the courts. For example, the courts
were at one time developing a "legal distraction" doctrine.7'
That is, some courts determined, as a matter of law, that
certain distractions common to modern life were so prevalent,
uncontrollable and pernicious as to constitute a complete
defense to a claim of negligence. For example, in one case, a
woman tripped on a recently repaired sidewalk while being
distracted by the sound of a nearby car horn.72 She claimed that
she failed to notice the danger because of the distraction. The
court found that such a distraction would have diverted any
reasonable person's attention, and deemed her momentary
inattention reasonable .
The legal distraction doctrine developed in response to a
comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts defining the
skills and abilities of the reasonable person.74 The Restatement
contends that distractions that cannot be avoided might undo a
finding of negligence that would otherwise attach to a lapse in
attention. It also identifies examples of distractions that do not
have such an effect. For example, driving while also trying to
quiet a screaming child might be considered a legal distraction,
71 KEETON, supra note 11, § 67.
72 Knapp v. City of Bradford, 247 A.2d 575, 575-76 (1968).
71 Id. at 577.
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. b (1965).
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inasmuch as any reasonable parent might find driving to be
more difficult under the circumstances. At the same time,
however, the reasonable driver arguably should consider
pulling over to console the child. Sudden distractions outside of
the actors control might divert most people's attention and
should preclude a finding of negligence for inattention. Had the
doctrine developed more thoroughly, it would have had to
identify whether the decision to press on in the face of
distractions would be considered negligent.
In developing this legal distraction doctrine, of course,
the courts relied on their own intuition about what a
reasonable person would find distracting. In effect, they
substituted their own judgment about the effect of distractions
on attention for that of a jury. Perhaps such judgments are no
better informed than a jury's ad hoc judgments about cognitive
abilities applied in every case. Nevertheless, the development
of such a doctrine reflects an attempt to reach a consensus on
human ability that at least has a chance to be informed by
empirical findings and expert analysis.
The doctrine has not flourished, arguably because of the
shift to comparative negligence. Courts, in effect, took the easy
way out by forcing legal factfinders to weigh the relative fault
of each party in a case-by-case fashion. Courts began to
proliferate the legal distraction doctrine (much like its more
influential cousin, "last clear chance") as a means of softening
the apparent harshness of contributory negligence.75 Under a
contributory negligence scheme, a plaintiff-driver who would
otherwise recover from a clearly negligent driver could lose
entirely if his attention had lapsed somewhat. This seemed to
courts an unjust result if the lapse in attention was not really
the plaintiffs fault. The courts developed the legal distraction
doctrine to address such circumstances. By contrast, under a
comparative negligence regime, courts simply place the conduct
of each party into evidence and let the factfinder compare fault
under the circumstances.
In a comparative negligence regime, the effects of biases
in meta-cognition are uncertain. Both parties will seem more
culpable than is the case. In practice, the effects of such biases
on each party is that they are unlikely to cancel out each other.
Instead, depending on the role that cognitive abilities play in
the assessment of each party, one of the two parties may gain
75 See Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953).
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some unwarranted advantage. Under a comparative negligence
system, however, it is difficult to determine whether
overestimation of human abilities generally benefits plaintiffs
or defendants more; and further research may be necessary
before one can make any clear statements about legal policy.
4. The Plaintiff in Products Liability Cases
One area of law where the courts do seem concerned
with the overstatement of human ability is the law governing
products liability. If courts overstate people's ability to avoid
injuries, then the users of many products might find
themselves unable to recover from manufacturers and others in
the distributive chain who sell products that fail to protect
users against foreseeable lapses in attention or ability. That is,
users often erroneously will seem to be negligent in failing to
pay enough attention while using a product or in otherwise
using the product in an unreasonable fashion. If such findings
exonerated manufacturers, they would fail to safeguard against
such avoidable injuries. To avoid this problem, courts charge
manufacturers with saving plaintiffs from their own
negligence, so long as such negligence is foreseeable."6
Again consider the example of the driver who is
traveling at a reasonable speed, but whose actions are deemed
unreasonable because the factfinder overestimates human
ability to react to road hazards.77 Suppose that instead of
hitting a pedestrian the driver hits a large rock in the road,
causing him to lose control of the vehicle.78 Should the
factfinder determine that a reasonable person could have seen
the rock sooner than was actually the case, or determine that
the driver should have been able to react to the hazard more
quickly than actually was possible, the factfinder will identify
the driver's negligence as a primary cause of his injuries. If
products liability recognizes driver negligence as a defense to
any claim by the driver that the automobile manufacturer
failed to install available, cost-effective safety devices into the
car, then the manufacturer will face fewer incentives to install
such precautionary devices. Misperception of plaintiffs'
cognitive abilities might make negligence determinations so
76 DOBBS, supra note 4, at 1027.
77 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.




common and so erroneous that the manufacturer's ability to
hide behind a phony negligence defense would dramatically
undermine the manufacturer's incentives to make a car
crashworthy. Recognizing this, the courts limit the use of a
negligence defense when such negligence is foreseeable.
This analysis is even more compelling for lapses in
attention. A plaintiff who sliced off a finger while using a meat
grinder can still recover from the grinder's manufacturer, even
if he was negligently distracted while using the product."9 The
logic underlying this outcome is that manufacturers of such
devices know that, at one time or another, users will get
distracted or use the product in a way that is, given human
ability, unsafe. If, in the face of such knowledge, a
manufacturer fails to install cost-effective safeguards to protect
the user from his own negligence, then the manufacturer will
be liable. °
In developing modern products liability law, courts have
recognized the inevitability that users occasionally will take
shortcuts or get distracted. By adopting this position in
products liability cases, courts effectively avoid ad hoc, case-by-
case judgments about users' abilities. The manufacturer, with a
host of knowledge about the product and the likely
consequences of the users' lapses in attention or ability, is
much better positioned to prevent harm." Furthermore,
manufacturers effectively control the circumstances that
determine the product's use: whether it will invite distraction,
present an overly complicated array of stimuli or encourage
haste. Manufacturers' design choices are closely analogous to
drivers' decisions about when and under what conditions to
drive. Like drivers, manufacturers might also suffer from
misunderstandings of cognitive abilities. But unlike drivers,
manufacturers have the capacity to employ human factors
experts and rely on aggregate data on the effects of product
design to guide their choices. Ignorance of human ability might
constitute a viable defense for an automobile driver, but not for
an automobile manufacturer.
Hence, the manufacturer remains accountable, even
though it may appear that users were negligent. Even though
courts will discuss plaintiffs' apparent negligence in such cases,
79 DOBBS, supra 4, at 1024.
so Id.
" Id. at 985-86.
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plaintiff negligence does not preclude recovery. In effect, courts
do not trust their own judgments about a user's negligence,
instead they force manufacturers to guard against foreseeable
misuse by the consumer. Thus, even if courts overstate users'
abilities, this overstatement does not adversely affect liability
and recovery in the products liability system.
C. Expert Testimony on Human Performance and
Perception of Human Performance
Perhaps the most straightforward means of correcting
erroneous beliefs about cognitive abilities is with expert
testimony. Under prevailing standards for admissibility of
expert testimony in the federal courts (which are also followed
in many states), expert testimony is admissible if it is reliable
and would prove helpful to the jury.82 Reliability requires
courts to delve into the scientific process, but the standard that
courts use clearly favors admissibility of the psychological
research on both cognitive ability and on meta-cognition.
Virtually all of the psychological research is published in peer-
reviewed journals, which courts view as an important element
of reliability. Moreover, none of it was prepared specifically for
litigation, which has been a problem for some types of
testimony. Such testimony faces other obstacles, however.
Courts might determine that expert testimony on
human abilities is not helpful to the factfinder. To the extent
that judges believe that intuition about human abilities is
reasonably accurate, they will see no need for expert testimony.
Such reasoning clearly treats psychology as a second-class
science, but scholars have identified such treatment in other
contexts.83 A serious review of the research on cognitive beliefs
should convince an objective observer that there is much that is
not intuitive about human cognitive ability. The recent
research on meta-cognition should pave the way for
admissibility of research on cognitive ability.
A more serious obstacle to admitting expert testimony
on meta-cognitive processes is that such testimony might sound
to judicial ears more like testimony about the law than
testimony about helpful facts. The meta-cognitive research goes
well beyond identifying gaps in ordinary understanding of
82 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
'3 THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS
(Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980).
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cognitive abilities. Indeed, the meta-cognitive research
undermines reliance on the reasonable person test altogether.
To date the literature includes no evidence that erroneous
beliefs about human cognitive abilities can be corrected
sufficiently to make the system workable. Consequently,
testimony indicating that lay intuition overstates cognitive
abilities is more of a general legal issue than a factual or
contextual issue that might dispose of a specific case. As such,
it is best addressed toward broad legal reform rather than case-
specific inquiries. Courts will therefore be reluctant to admit it
because expert testimony is supposed to help the factfinder
determine what happened, not help the court determine what
rules to apply.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions of cognitive psychologists who study
what people believe about cognitive abilities identify a deeply
troubling aspect of the reasonable person test. The reasonable
person must be endowed with cognitive abilities in order to aid
the factfinder in identifying reasonable and unreasonable
conduct. If these hypothetical abilities exceed those of most
people, then the system improperly will identify reasonable
conduct as being unreasonable and the standard to which
litigants are held will be unfair. Although some legal doctrines
soften the effects of this error somewhat, these doctrines were
not intended to remedy meta-cognitive biases and cannot be
expected to correct perfectly for them. Neither is expert
testimony necessarily going to correct the problem in any
meaningful way.
Realistically, the research on visual meta-cognition is
unlikely to affect the widespread reliance on the reasonable
person test as it now exists and is implemented. First, the test
has a long history behind it. Adherence to such a long history of
precedent is generally advisable, inasmuch as departures from
it might have many unintended consequences. Second, the
intuitive aspects of the test are at the heart of its virtues. The
intuitively based aspect of the test is designed precisely to
make the negligence inquiry tractable. Tractability at the
expense of accuracy is hard to tolerate, but the degree of
inaccuracy would have to outweigh the virtues of tractability.
Third, as the research now stands, the influence of meta-
cognitive biases on real behavior and real negligence
determinations is uncertain. In the real world, other aspects of
[Vol. 68: 41090
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cognitive processes might allow people to muddle through well
enough.84 Meta-cognitive errors may lead us astray only in
unusual or novel circumstances.85
Despite these limitations, the research on meta-
cognitive biases has serious implications for the legal system
that should not be ignored. Even a venerable judicial
institution should not be exempt from progress in the social
sciences. To the extent that the heavy reliance on mistaken
intuitive beliefs about cognitive biases creates mistakes, the
courts should entertain some remedy.
See John H. Flavell, Development of Knowledge About Vision, in VISUAL
METACOGNITION: THINKING ABOUT SEEING (Daniel Levin ed., forthcoming 2003).
11 See LEVIN & BECK, supra note 39.
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